TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION
U.S. OFFICE
[illegible] 5th Street, Suite 4550
New York, N.Y. 10019
Telephone (212)223-0303

October 13, 1986

Mr. Philip Davis, Director
Office of Defects Investigation, Enforcement
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
400 Seventh Street S. W.
Washington, D. C. 20590

RE: NEF-12gdc, PA85-04[illegible]

Dear Mr. Davis:

Enclosed is our technical report which includes investigation results of the two cruise control computers returned from your office and Toyota's technical justification of the recall filed on September 30, 1986.

Should you have any questions on the matter, please contact us.

Sincerely,

TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION

Kenichi Kato
General Manager
U.S. Office

KK:cc

P.S. Please note that the information claimed to be confidential is deleted and is being sent to the Chief Counsel's office under separate cover.

459

TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION
U.S. OFFICE
[illegible] 57th Street, Suite 4550
New York, N.Y. 10019
Telephone (212) 2[illegible]

October 13, 1986

Mrs. Erika Jones
Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
400 Seventh Street, S. W.
Washington, D. C. 20590

RE: NEF-12gdc, EA85-045

Dear Mrs. Jones:

Enclosed are two (2) copies of Toyota's technical report for which we request confidential treatment. This report includes our investigation results of the two cruise control computers of 1982 Cressida models returned from NHTSA and our technical justification of the recall filed on September 30, 1986. This report, without the claimed confidential material, has been sent to the Office of Defects Investigation under separate cover.

We claim that page 1, section 4 through page 3 of "Summary of Toyota's Inspection of the Failed Cruise Control Computer" and Attachments I through VI contain confidential commercial information. These documents include a computer circuit diagram, the manufacturing and production control methods of the cruise control computer and Toyota's failure analysis procedure, all of which is our proprietary information and know-how, obtained or established through our own experience and engineering efforts.

We also claim that Photos 1 through 10 should be confidential material. Although computers such as the ones photographed are readily accessible, those photographs were taken as part of our failure analysis procedure and some of those were photographed by using sophisticated instrumentation. The procedure and the instrumentation were developed by Toyota, thus release of these may result in significant competitive damage to us.

855

Although these procedures and methodologies are specifically applied to the cruise control unit of our vehicles, they could also be adapted and used by competitors. Their disclosure would certainly compromise the competitive advantage they confer on Toyota. Therefore, we request that the enclosed documents, claimed to be confidential, be treated as such. Toyota appreciates your support of our claim of confidentiality with respect to the material so identified.

If we can be of further help, please contact us.

Sincerely,

TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION

Kenichi Kato
General Manager
U.S. Office

FK:cc

Fig.1 VOLTAGE CHECK RESULTS

IGNITION	CRUISE CONTROL MAIN SWITCH	ENGINE	V_C			V_R			V_A			V_B		
			a	b	c	a	b	c	a	b	c	a	b	c
OFF	OFF	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ON			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ON		9.5	9.5	0	9	9	0	0	0	0	11	11	11
		IDLING	—	—	0	—	—	0	—	—	0	—	—	13
		RACING	—	—	0	—	—	0	—	—	0	—	—	13

(NOTE)

a: NHTSA test vehicle with failed computer

b: Toyota brought-in vehicle with failed computer

c: Toyota brought-in vehicle with original computer

-: Not measured